








International Journal of Business and Social Science Research 
 
 
Vol: 1, Issue: 2 
October/2020 
https://ijbssrnet.com/index.php/ijbssr 
DOI: 10.47742/ijbssr.v1n2p4   
©The Institute of Academic Research and Publication                                                                                          http://iarpnet.org/  
REMEDIES FOR THE CRISIS AND CORONAVIRUS-INDUCED INSOLVENCY: WHAT LEGAL "WEAPONS" ARE AVAILABLE 
TO FIGHT THIS "WAR”? 
 
Maria Margherita Lazzara 
Researcher of Economics Law 






A R T I C L E  I N F O  
Article history: Article 
Received  
Revised  
Accepted:  16 October, 2020 
DOI: 10.47742/ijbssr.v1n2p4  
 
 A B S T R A C T  
This paper aims to define certain rules that may accompany insolvent enterprises 
and over-indebted households in post-pandemic recovery. At this time, the crucial 
need to provide entrepreneurs, creditors, debtors, and consumers with certainties 
cannot be delayed. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, various countries are 
adopting measures to change the application of their insolvency laws. The Virus was 
circulating in Italy before spreading to all other European countries, therefore the 
Italian government had to adopt urgent measures, which drastically impacted 
insolvency and collective procedures, inter alia. 
The paper focuses on the legislative provisions adopted by the Italian government as 
compared to the recent communication of the European Commission of 19 March 
2020 ("The new temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the 
economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak") and to the Directive (U.E.) 2019/1023 
on restructuring and insolvency. 
In light of the foregoing, two solutions will be formulated that may be immediately 
adopted in support of the debt of enterprises and households to ensure the 
successful recovery of solvency. 
 
 Keywords : Insolvency, Crisis, Over-indebtedness, COVID-19, pandemic, 
Lockdown, Consumers, Households, Enterprises. 
 
1. Introduction:  
 
It will be possible to observe the worst recession since 
the 1929 crisis in the course of 2020/2021. The most serious 
repercussions shall probably be faced by Italy, since a contraction 
in productivity equal to 9.1% is expected1, due to the sudden cash 
flow interruption generated by business activities and by the 
difficulty, if not impossibility, of predicting future cash flows2. 
Most enterprises have had no revenues for almost two months 
and the ongoing provisions inviting caution and social distancing 
will affect future business activities to such an extent that, in 
many cases, reopening is not viable or cost-effective3.   
 
                                                             
1 Cfr. www.imf.org/en/ International monetary Fund;  www.bancaditalia.it/, BANCA 
D’ITALIA, Economic  Bulletin 2/2020, p. 26; PROMETEIA, March estimated reporting 2020, 
www.prometeia.it 
2 The Communication from the commission (Temporary Framework for State aid measures to 
support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak 2020/C 91 I/01) says :”In the 
exceptional circumstances created by the COVID-19 outbreak, undertakings of all kinds may 
face a severe lack of liquidity. Solvent or less solvent undertakings alike may face a sudden 
shortage or even unavailability of liquidity. SMEs are at particular risk. This can therefore 
seriously affect the economic situation of many healthy undertakings and their employees in the 
short and medium term, while having also longer-lasting effects by endangering their survival. 
3 www.bancaditalia.it, Literature Review Issue no. 2, Covid-19 and Economic Analysis: a 
Review of the Debate, by Caracciolo - Cingano - Ercolani - Ferrero - Hassan - Papetti - 
Tommasino. 
The stringent forms of lockdown, adopted to contain the 
pandemic, plunged a very high number of enterprises and 
households into a “crisis” situation4 or actual “insolvency”5. The 
cardinal role of legislation dedicated to the crisis, to the 
likelihood of insolvency, to the insolvency and over-
indebtedness6  is therefore apparent. Several concerned voices 
are being raised, also looking to the future, suggesting recipes and 
pinpointing solutions so that the significant epidemic infection 
may not (irreparably) expand from a healthcare level to an 
economic level. 
 
4 The definition of “crisis” in the art. 2, lett. a) of the new Code of Enterprise Crisis and 
Insolvency (Codice della Crisi d’Impresa e dell’Insolvenza - C.C.I.I.- D. lgs. 12 gennary 2019. 
N. 14-) is the "State of economic and financial difficulty which makes the debtor's insolvency 
probable, and which for companies is manifested as inadequate future cash flows to meet the 
planned obligations regularly". 
5 The art. 2, lett. b), Code of Enterprise Crisis and Insolvency (Codice della Crisi d’Impresa e 
dell’Insolvenza -C.C.I.I.-) stated that insolvency is "the state of the debtor which is manifested 
by defaults or other external events, which demonstrate that the debtor is no longer able to fulfil 
his obligations regularly". 
6 The “over-indebtness” is, under art. 2, lett. c) of C.C.I.I., “The state of crisis or insolvency of 
the consumer, professional, minor entrepreneur, agricultural entrepreneur, innovative start-
ups ..., and any other debtor not subject to Judicial Liquidation (Bankrupty) or to Compulsory 
Administrative Liquidation or to other liquidation procedures provided for by the Civil code or 
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Based on the legislation adopted as a matter of urgency 
in these past few days by the Italian government, we would like 
to afford some food for thought as well as some solutions for the 
considerable problems that the health emergency has already 
posted and will continue to pose shortly for enterprises and 
consumers unable to meet their payment obligations. 
 
In our view it is urgent, and thus can no longer be 
postponed, to develop the first line of intervention able to read 
and pro-actively "to filter" the crisis suffered at the individual 
level: "viable debtors, honest entrepreneurs, and other natural 
persons”. 
 
Moreover, a second action plan should, prospectively, 
look to the system. There is an urgent need to define a specific 
regime, a "special" regulatory framework for enterprises in the 
time of Covid-19. Just as Coronavirus patients need to be isolated 
from other patients, arranging for health facilities "dedicated" to 
their care and separated from common facilities, it is paramount 
to identify "system" solutions by providing for a set of dedicated 
tools for "infected" enterprises and for over-indebted households 
as a result of the measures adopted by the Government to contain 
the pandemic. 
 
2. Italian legislative remedies adopted from March to July 
 
In this extremely delicate macroeconomic scenario, in 
these past few months, numerous legislative provisions have been 
issued that contain an array of temporary measures impacting 
substantive, bankruptcy, and corporate law. Especially drastic 
remedies have been adopted, defined as "instances of law of war 
issued in times of peace".  
 
In a nutshell, it is worth mentioning the following: 
 
- Legislative Decree no. 9 of 2 March 2020 and 
Legislative Decree no. 11 of 8 March 20207, respectively 
providing the suspension of procedural time-limits; the 
suspension of the mandatory, legal and conventional, substantive 
and procedural time-limits, entailing prescriptions and 
forfeitures, as well as time frames for the fulfillment of 
contractual obligations. The time-limits relative to executive 
processes and insolvency procedures, as well as the time frame 
for the notification of the official reports, for the execution of 
reduced payment, for carrying out defense activities, and for the 
                                                             
7 “Urgent measures for families, workers and businesses related to the epidemiological 
emergency from COVID-19 " and " Extraordinary and urgent measures to counter the 
epidemiological emergency from COVID-19 and contain the negative effects on judicial 
activity". Both decrees have lapsed, but the main provisions have been transferred, now, to the 
Law no. 27 of 24 April 2020. 
8 "Conversion in law, with amendments, of the decree-law 17 March 2020, n. 18, containing 
measures to strengthen the National Health Service and economic support for families, workers 
and businesses connected to the epidemiological emergency from COVID-19. Extension of 
deadlines for the adoption of legislative decrees. " 
9 "Conversion in law, with amendments, of the decree-law 8 April 2020, n. 23, containing urgent 
measures regarding access to credit and tax obligations for companies, special powers in 
strategic sectors, as well as health and work interventions, extension of administrative and 
procedural terms. " 
10 In the Agreements with creditors (Concordati preventivi) and the Restructuring 
Agreements (Accordi di ristrutturazione), that are pending after February 23 2020, the debtor 
can obtain from the Court a new deadline (not exceeding 90 days) to offer a new plan of 
restructuration; it had to take into account of the financials rewards caused by the Covid-19.   
It’s not clear if this provision is referred only to the Agreement approved by creditors otherwise 
to the Agreement admitted by the Court but not voted yet by creditors. 
submission of legal appeals have also been suspended, for the 
same period and vis-à-vis the same individuals. 
 
- Law no. 27 of 24 April 20208 chiefly addresses the 
responsibility of the debtor, namely the incidence of the 
emergency in appraising the conduct of the debtor responsible for 
meeting his/her obligation; effectively providing for a cause of 
exclusion, by law, of fault on the debtor's part; 
 
- Law no. 40 of 5 June 20209 providing, first of all, for 
the postponement of the entry into force of the new Italian Code 
of Enterprise Crisis and Insolvency to September 2021. It is 
prescribed the suspension of the deadlines of the fulfillment 
of Agreements with Creditors (Concordati preventivi) and of the 
approved Restructuring Agreements (Accordi di ristrutturazione), 
of the suspension of the deadlines for negotiable instruments, of 
the suspension of tax payments and contributions. It has been 
provided that appeals may not be pursued for the declaration 
of Bankruptcy (Fallimento) or Compulsory Administrative 
Liquidation (Liquidazione Coatta Amministrativa), for the 
ascertainment of the state of insolvency in the Extraordinary 
Administration of large enterprises in crisis (Amministrazione 
Straordinaria delle Grandi imprese in crisi) until 31 December 2020. 
Lastly, a gamut of provisions dedicated to Agreements with 
Creditors and approved restructuring Agreements is 
introduced10. Specifically, to avoid termination of Agreements 
with Creditors and of Restructuring Agreements already 
approved or implemented between 23 February 2020 and 31 
December 2021, a six-month extension has been provided for the 
deadlines of their fulfillment11. 
All these interventions are merely aimed at "postponing" the 
consequences of the current crisis. Therefore, they can be viewed 
as "first aid measures" unsuitable for effectively facing what is 
referred to as “phase two”12. The instruments made available by 
the Italian legislator to date mostly consist of suspensory 
mechanisms operating at various levels and profiles of 
substantive, bankruptcy, and corporate law13. On the other hand, 
existing institutions must adjust more efficiently to the idea that 
economic time cannot stop because of the pandemic. 
Concentrating now solely on insolvency proceedings, it is useful 
to touch upon:  
 
 
11 The extension afforded by the law does not require any application by the debtor or even any 
judicial decision, as referred: Ambrosini, La “falsa partenza” del Codice della Crisi, le novità 
del Decreto Liquidità e il tema dell’insolvenza incolpevole, www.ilcaso.it, 21/04/2020. 
12 A strong recommendation is coming from the Executive Board of CERIL (Conference of 
European Restructuring and Insolvency Law) for all European 
legislators, https://know.cerved.com/news/covid-19-e-sostenibilita-delle-imprese/. 
Un’approfondita disamina, che muove proprio dal rapporto CERIL, in G. CORNO, L. 
PANZANI, I prevedibili effetti del Coronavirus sulla disciplina delle procedure concorsuali, in 
IL CASO.it (25/03/2020).  
13 The rules on capital reduction, preparing of the budget, social’s financing are suspended. 
During the year 2020 are suspended also other legal duty: the articles 2446, 2° e 3°, 2447, 
2482 bis, 4°, 5° e 6°, e 2482 ter, 2484, n. 4, 2545 duodecies cod. civ. won’t be applied. On equal 
terms, the prevision in the articles 2467 e 2497 quinquies cod. civ., related to the partner’s 
financial, are suspended too. This statement can be a great tool that can be useful for sourcing 
new funds for enterprises. See, IRRERA - FREGONARA, La crisi d’impresa e la continuità 
aziendale ai tempi del coronavirus 
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1) the postponement of the entry into force of the Italian 
Code of Enterprise Crisis and Insolvency –C.C.I.I.- (unlike the 
envisaged date - August 2020 - it shall come into force in 
September 2021);  
 
2) Bankruptcy petitions blocked until 30 June 2020; 
 
Hence, we can only endorse the decision to postpone the 
entry into force of the Code; it was essential to avoid the 
interpretative and procedural difficulties which probably would 
have arisen during the implementation phase of new institutions 
and rules yet to be fully proven. This enables the entrepreneurial 
world, the courts, and the operators in the sector to keep relying 
on well-known and well-established insolvency mechanisms14. 
However, as shall be elucidated presently, it would be useful to 
anticipate the operation of those rules in the Code of Crisis that 
only bring about a few ameliorative improvements to institutions 
already regulated in Bankruptcy law15. 
 
Conversely, the choice to consider inadmissible the 
appeal for the declaration of bankruptcy or also for the 
ascertainment of the state of insolvency (even where proposed by 
the debtor himself!) does not appear to be commendable. The 
solution not even allowing for the self-represented bankruptcy of 
enterprises manifestly beyond recovery, possibly for reasons 
preceding the outbreak of the pandemic, was deemed as 
excessively drastic, but above all irrational: an unjustified 
obligation for those who already are over-indebted to continue 
their business activity16. 
 
Regrettably, it may be observed that no ad 
hoc instruments functional to the asserted plan for overcoming 
the crisis are introduced. In our opinion, the truly dramatic aspect 
is that no difference is made between enterprises hit by the crisis 
as a result of the measures adopted for "Covid-19" and those 
already over-indebted due to other existing reasons17. The 
measures introduced are directed indistinctly at all enterprises 
experiencing difficulties, assuming that this situation is 
engendered by the pandemic. The identification of the origin of 
the crisis represents a profile, that appears to be a prerequisite, 
stemming from emergency legislation and which, instead, may 
under no circumstances be underestimated. 
 
3. Suggestions to find some remedies for enterprises and 
households. 
 
It is key, in the development of an effective recovery 
plan, to differentiate between legislation and the remedies to 
"cure" individuals indebted due to the measures for containing 
                                                             
14 The significant novelty introduced by the new Code of Enterprise Crisis and Insolvency 
(Codice della Crisi d’Impresa e dell’Insolvenza - C.C.I.I.) is the so-called “Early Warning 
procedure” (Procedure di Allerta) -artt. 12 ss. C.C.I.I.-: a sophisticated normative system 
designed to a virtuous path by a surveillance system that allows for preventive procedures 
concerning restructuring. In this tough time of extensive defaulting and actual debt crisis, the 
application of the “benchmarks” -provided by the artt. 12-25 C.C.I.I.-, could cause the 
insolvency for the 1/3 of the Italian enterprises. 
15 For this idea, Santangeli - Fabbi,  Il (giusto) differimento, in ragione dell’emergenza, della 
entrata in vigore del Codice della crisi d’impresa e dell’insolvenza; ma è indispensabile che 
alcune norme entrino in vigore immediatamente, in Judicium, 2020. 
16 There are a few exception of this general rule that fixed the inadmissibility of the petition for 
the declaration of Bankruptcy a) the proposal by the debtor himself when insolvency don’t 
depend on the Corona virus; b) the Bankruptcy petition is a result of a lack of preconditions for 
the Agreement with creditors (Concordato preventivo) -art. 162, 2° l. f.-, for the repeal of 
the spread of Covid-19 and the insolvency procedures currently 
in force and targeting prior insolvencies or insolvencies 
generated for other reasons. A mandatory step for the legislator 
should have been (and should be, shortly) precisely that of not 
allocating any "safe conducts" for opportunistic behavior. To this 
end, it is necessary to provide valid instruments to ascertain the 
origin of the financial difficulties, building a surveillance system 
that allows for the early detection of over-indebtedness and, thus, 
to be able to make a realistic prognosis of recovery18. 
 
To enhance the provisions made to date by the legislator, 
it is pointed out, in any case, that through the generally estimated 
suspension of the time-limit for the fulfillment, the legislator has 
introduced an actual cause of exclusion, by law, of the fault on 
the debtor's part. Esteemed jurists claim that "force majeure" 
could be called upon for a reinterpretation of legislation of our 
bankruptcy law that defines the state of insolvency, the state of 
crisis and over-indebtedness, excluding the declaration of 
bankruptcy if failure to fulfill own obligations is determined 
by force majeure, namely by elements that, under their 
extraordinary and unpredictable nature, lead to an objective 
inability to fulfill19. Indeed, there is no doubt that the crisis or the 
insolvency caused by the lockdown, provided for to manage the 
health emergency, is in no way ascribable to the debtor and it is 
common knowledge that, for some time now, the legislative 
approach to over-indebtedness is universally aimed at 
safeguarding the "deserving" debtor facing financial deficit 
through no fault of his/her own. 
 
This proposal, under the conditions specified hereinafter, 
might constitute a suitable response to the current situation and is 
also aligned with the so-called "philosophy of forgiveness" that 
is the legal heritage of all evolved legal systems at the European 
and global levels20. The “insolvent but honest” debtor is the 
“protagonist” of the aforesaid Directive (EU) 2019/1023; debt 
discharge for the “deserving” debtor, namely s/he who is heavily 
indebted because of a sudden and unforeseeable economic 
situation, is the go-to instrument to improve restructuring for a 
fresh start. In this respect, the Directive specifies the methods for 
ascertaining this status: under paragraph 79 is it stated that “in 
establishing whether an entrepreneur was dishonest, judicial or 
administrative authorities might take into account circumstances 
such as the nature and extent of the debt; the time when the debt 
was incurred; the efforts of the entrepreneur to pay the debt and 
comply with legal obligations, including public licensing 
requirements and the need for proper bookkeeping; actions on the 
the Agreement -art. 173, 2° e 3°, l.f- and reject the Court approval -art. 180, 7°, l. f.-; c) the 
Public Prosecutor ask declaration of Bankruptcy. 
17 For that reasons the Suisse Federal Office of Justice (COVID-19-Verordnung Justiz und 
Verfahrensrecht) is studyng a transitional regime with a "flexible" procedure characterised by 
the moratorium to assist small and medium-sized enterprises hit by the crisis for "Covid-
19"; www.bj.admin.ch/ejpd/it/home/news (2020-04-09 and 2020-04-16). 
18 On the legal concept of “recovery”, to select the  companies in financial ill-health, see, 
Minervini, Disciplina della crisi e diritto della concorrenza, in Riv. dir. comm, 2019, I, pag. 
299 ss. 
19 See, Limitone, La forza maggiore nel giudizio sull’insolvenza, www.ilcaso.it, 2 aprile 2020 
and Monticelli – Rosati, Il sole 24Ore, 24 aprile 2020. 
20 Let us refer to our work on this subject: Lazzara, Riflessioni sulla meritevolezza del 










International Journal of Business and Social Science Research 
 
 
Vol: 1, Issue: 2 
October/2020 
https://ijbssrnet.com/index.php/ijbssr 
DOI: 10.47742/ijbssr.v1n2p4   
©The Institute of Academic Research and Publication                                                                                          http://iarpnet.org/  
entrepreneur's part to frustrate recourse by creditors; the 
fulfillment of duties in the likelihood of insolvency, which is 
incumbent on entrepreneurs who are directors of a company; and 
compliance with Union and national competition and labor law”. 
 
The second profile that is the focus of this paper aims to 
propose practical and effective measures to manage the financial 
difficulties of all those affected whose crisis is caused exclusively 
by the lockdown measures. Researchers are wondering if to 
alleviate the emergency, in terms of the entrepreneurial crisis, 
new, more rapid, and streamlined procedures may prove 
necessary as opposed to the existing ones which are more 
convoluted and detailed21. 
 
I believe that appropriate instruments already exist in the 
provisions of the current Bankruptcy law and also in the new 
Code of Crisis, which could be appropriate for the economic 
situation with a few simple amendments that do not cause a crisis 
of rejection22. Being aware of the sensitive nature of this subject, 
that undoubtedly requires greater in-depth inquiry, we would like 
to suggest an adaptation of existing legislation on Moratorium 
Agreement -under art. 62 C.C.I.I-, Confirmed Recovery Plans - 
under Art. 56 C.C.I.I.- or Restructuring Agreements by possibly 
taking advantage of the improvements brought by the Code of 
Crisis to these procedures. In this respect, it suffices to cite the 
instance of the "Agreements with extended effectiveness" (art. 61 
C.C.I.I.), or the possibility to renegotiate and modify a Recovery 
Plan already advanced according to art. 58 C.C.I.I...  
 
Irrespective of the legislative choice, the simplified, 
essentially streamlined, swift, and flexible procedure must be 
characterized by the recurrence of some necessary elements: 
i) moratorium and debt discharge for the "faultless" debtor; ii) 
prohibition to open bankruptcy proceedings; iii) "protective 
measures" ensured, such as the blocking of enforcement actions 
of “automatic stay” creditors; iv) approval of creditors, possibly 
with an implicit favorable vote; v) facilitating measures for 
capitalization and financing; vi) support to corporate continuity23. 
 
                                                             
21 See, inter alia, recently, Della Santina, Le discipline dell’insolvenza e della crisi d’impresa 
ai tempi della pandemia da covid – 19. impressioni e spunti di riflessione , www.ilcaso.it, 1 
aprile 2020. 
22 The moment of deep doubt that we are living in, require a particular caution from the ideas 
of estimeed jurists which suggest innovations and changes; they suggest to import measures 
from other system to use them in the insolvency proceeding, for instance the Technical 
Preventive Assessment (Accertamento Tecnico Preventivo -art. 696 Civil Procedural Code-), 
or the Support Administration for incapacitated people (Amministrazione di Sostegno -artt. 
404-413 Civil Code-) or, furthermore, introduce again the old Controlled 
Administration (Amministrazione Controllata -repealed by the D.lgs. 6/2005-). See, 
Censoni, La gestione delle crisi sistemiche delle imprese da Covid-19 fra legge fallimentare e 
codice della crisi e dell’insolvenza: il ritorno dell’amministrazione controllata?, 
www.ilcaso.it, 3 giugno 2020; Galletti, Il diritto della crisi sospeso e la legislazione 
concorsuale in tempo di guerra, www.ilfallimentarista.it, 15 aprile 2020. 
23 On this points esteemed jurists agrees, most recently: Ambrosini, La “falsa partenza” del 
codice della crisi, le novità del decreto liquidità e il tema dell’insolvenza incolpevole 
, www.dirittobancario.it.; Fimmanò, La resilienza dell’impresa di fronte alla crisi da 
coronavirus mediante affitto d’azienda alla newCo-start up, auto-fallimento e concordato 
“programmati” , www.ilcaso.it, 1 april 2020; Leuzzi, Dalla crisi all’emergenza: la 
prededuzione al tempo del covid-19, www.ilcaso.it, 22 march 2020. 
 
24 Art.2, Directive EU 2029/1023 stating that “practitioner in the field of restructuring’ means 
any person or body appointed by a judicial or administrative authority to carry out, in 
particular, one or more of the following tasks: (a) assisting the debtor or the creditors in 
drafting or negotiating a restructuring plan; (b) supervising the activity of the debtor during 
To tackle the crisis in a pro-active manner without further 
increasing, in these difficult times, the burden on the judiciary, 
these "simplified" procedures could be entrusted to specialized 
sections in Courts, possibly by appointing honorary judges and 
lay judges endowed with specific legal or economic and 
corporate expertise24. Likewise, the idea is widely accepted of 
entrusting their management to existing Organisms such as 
Italian O.C.C. (Crisis Management Organism, Law no. 3 of 27 
January 2012) or the established Italian O.Cri. (Crisis Organism, 
Art. 2, lett. u), C.C.I.I.25), possibly under the supervision of the 
Chambers of Commerce. 
 
The Italian government, rather than indiscriminate all-
round distribution financing and bonus “to rain”, should have to 
support the procedural costs and pay the “manager of crisis” to 
assist the debtor over-indebtness and to negotiate a restructuring 
Plan among creditors26. This idea appears to be in line with the 
compatibility conditions sets out by the Commission -at § 3- to 
apply to the aid granted by the Member States under Article 
107(3)(b) TFEU27.   
 
This proposal appears to be perfectly in line with all the 
principles of the aforementioned Directive (EU) 2019/1023 
aiming to strengthen, in Europe, a culture of recovery of 
enterprises in difficulty as a “preventive” measure. In this 
directive it is stated that “to promote efficiency and reduce delays 
and costs, national preventive restructuring frameworks should 
include flexible procedures, Member States should be able to 
limit the involvement of judicial or administrative authorities to 
situations in which it is necessary and proportionate while taking 
into consideration, among other things, the aim of safeguarding 
the rights and interests of debtors and of affected parties, as well 
as the aim of reducing delays and the cost of the procedures.”  
 
All States seem to be following this path by arranging for 
preventive restructuring frameworks taking place out of court, 
informal restructuring based on contractual agreements, and 
building a surveillance system that allows for the early detection 
of over-indebtedness.28  
the negotiations on a restructuring plan, and reporting to a judicial or administrative authority; 
(c) taking partial control over the assets or affairs of the debtor during negotiations”.  
25 Interesting legislative proposal comes from the Scientific Committee of C.R.I.S.I. (Centro 
Ricerca Interdipartimentale Impresa Sovraindebitamento Insolvenza) for a “Simplified 
procedure of crisis assisted settlement” (Procedura semplificata di composizione assistita 
della crisi); it’s specified an Organism more streamlined than the O.Cri., actually required by 
the artt. 16 ss. C.C.I.I., www.ilcaso.it, 7 maggio 2020. 
26 Among other, see DI CECCO, Spunti per una riflessione collettiva sulle misure adottate ed 
adottabili per il contrasto alla crisi economica da pandemia, www.ilcaso.it, 3 may 2020; 
GARESIO, Alla ricerca della liquidità perduta. prime considerazioni sulle misure di sostegno 
alle imprese e sui loro possibili impatti sui  
ratios patrimoniali delle banche, www.ilcaso.it, 17 april 2020; GOBBI, PALAZZO - 
SEGURA, Le misure di sostegno finanziario alle imprese post-covid-19 e le loro implicazioni 
di medio termine, www.bancaditalia.it. 
27 In the Communication (Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the 
economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak 2020/C 91 I/01) it is enounced that “Member 
States must therefore show that the State aid measures notified to the Commission under this 
Communication are necessary, appropriate and proportionate to remedy a serious disturbance 
in the economy of the Member State concerned and that all the conditions of this 
Communication are fully respected”. 
28 In Spain was adopted the “Real Decreto-Ley 08/2020 de 17 de Marzo 2020 e 16/2020, de 
28 de abril, de medidas procesales y organizativas para hacer frente al COVID-19 en el ámbito 
de la Administración de Justicia”. Among many : Gerbaudo, La respuesta del derecho 
concursal de Espana frente a la Pandemia Covid-19. Noticia del Real Decreto 28 abril 2020, 
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Since it is impossible to grasp the present without 
looking back to the past or ahead to the future, I would like to 
conclude by stressing that the Italian Civil Code (Royal Decree 
no. 262 of 16 March 1942) and, for all that falls within our remit, 
the Bankruptcy Law itself (Royal Decree no. 267 of 16 March 
1942), were drawn up and outlined in time of war within a 
historical and economical context of critical worldwide crisis; 
yet, the foresight of so many regulations has meant that these 
have remained unchanged to this day. Suffice to say that the 
notion of "insolvency" of the Bankruptcy Law of 1942 has been 
transferred without any amendments to art. 2 of the new Italian 
Code of Enterprise Crisis and Insolvency. Given the observations 
made by those who perceive, in the Coronavirus pandemic, the 
same devastating effects of a war-like situation, a correspondence 
is noted precisely with the new Italian Code of Enterprise Crisis 
and Insolvency. This legislative corpus, developed during a 
serious economic downturn, shall also be able to operate in an 
emergency context. Our legislative history leads us to confide in 
the ability of the Italian legislator to pinpoint recovery solutions; 
solutions also lasting in the medium-long term if the "protection" 
needs of indebted individuals and the interest of creditors in not 
having their rights affected can be suitably balanced. In 
conclusion, the difficult challenge of the legislator will be to 
successfully envisage concrete opportunities for a fresh start, 
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derecho concursal en tiempo de Covid-19, https://auren.com. In the same direction, the French 
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